Soviet Nationalities Policy and Assimilation

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~gorenbur/gorenburg%20assimilation.pdf
Forthcoming in Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine
(Cambridge University Press), edited by Blair Ruble, Nancy Popson and Dominique Arel.
Dmitry Gorenburg Harvard University gorenburg@gmail.com
In recent years, students of Soviet and post-Soviet nationalism have developed a consensus that Soviet nationalities policy unwittingly strengthened ethnic identity among minority populations in the Soviet Union. This view overly simplifies the actual thrust of Soviet nationalities policy in the post-Stalin period. The Soviet government pursued a dual course toward its minorities, enacting assimilationist policies at the same time as it maintained and even strengthened the ethnic institutions that were established in the 1920s. The slogan “national in form, but socialist in content,” symbolizes this dual approach. The national “forms” of ethnic republics, titular control of regional governments, and separate political and academic institutions for these republics all acted to reify and maintain ethnic identities. At the same time, the Soviet government enacted policies that favored the use of Russian. Officially, Russian was labeled the language of interethnic communication, but speaking Russian became an essential element of participating in Soviet society. Since language use is generally a zero-sum decision, promoting one central language inevitably led to a decline in use of competing national languages. And since language, in turn, is a key component of ethnic identity, the shift in language use away from national languages led to an increase in ethnic assimilation of members of non-Russian minorities.
While the institutionalization of ethnicity did reinforce ethnic identity among certain segments of the minority population, the assimilation policy had a remarkable effect in a relatively short period of time. The ethnic institutions established by Soviet
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policies strengthened the ethnic identity of many members of groups that had official homelands within the Soviet Union by privileging ethnic identity attributes over those of class, location, or religion.1 The effects of these policies were variable, depending on location and type of homeland region. These institutions operated locally, within the homelands, so that members of minority groups who lived elsewhere in the Soviet Union were particularly vulnerable to assimilation. The number and strength of ethnic institutions within the Soviet ethnic republics also varied depending on the republic’s status in the Soviet Union’s four-tier ethno-federal hierarchy. (Gorenburg 2003) Inhabitants of union republics, which had the most extensive networks of ethnic institutions, were on average less vulnerable to assimilation than inhabitants of autonomous republics, provinces, or districts, which were permitted to have progressively fewer ethnic institutions. Finally, the extent to which ethnic institutions prevented the assimilation of particular individuals depended on the extent to which these institutions played a significant role in people’s lives. For example, native language education and native language print media were more prevalent in rural than in urban areas. Theaters and academic institutes catered to city dwellers, but were used primarily by those with a connection to the countryside (Gorenburg 2003).
Other than variation in the extent of ethnic institutions, the factors that influenced the extent of variation in the level of assimilation included the number of Russians in the region and their settlement patterns, the extent to which Russian was known and used among that nationality prior to the nation-wide shift in favor of Russian language education and use, and the extent of linguistic differences between Russian and the national language of the republic.
1 For more on identity categories, and the attributes that make up these categories, please see Arel’s introduction to this volume.
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This paper begins with a critical discussion of the consensus that has recently emerged in the scholarly community on the impact of Soviet policies on assimilation and develop an alternative perspective that links Soviet nationality policies and trends in assimilation of minorities. In the following two sections, I develop a model of the assimilation process and present data that demonstrates the extent of assimilation in the Soviet Union by 1989 and describes the trends in assimilation from 1959 to 1989. I conclude by discussing the political consequences of assimilation during the late Soviet period.
Identity Promotion, Assimilation or Both?
The views of Western scholars on Soviet nationality policies have changed over time. In the 1970s and 1980s, most scholars believed that the Soviet government was engaged in an extensive and deliberate program of Russification that was aimed at destroying minority languages and cultures (Conquest 1986). This viewpoint was consistent with the dominant paradigm of the Cold War, which portrayed the Soviet Union as first and foremost a repressive state that aimed to eradicate all differences among its citizens in its efforts to create a “new Soviet man.” With the end of the Cold War and the concurrent explosion of nationalism in the Soviet Union and throughout the former Communist world, this dominant view was replaced by its opposite. The current dominant perspective among Western scholars is that not just the policies but even the very structure of the Soviet state strengthened ethnic identity among Soviet minorities. In this section, I show that this new conventional wisdom has gone too far in neglecting the extent to which the Soviet state was successful in assimilating part of its non-Russian population even as it strengthened the ethnic identities among other non-Russian Soviet
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citizens. I argue that scholars must recognize the tension between identity promotion and assimilation that was an inherent part of Soviet nationality policy throughout the Soviet Union’s existence.
But first, let me set out the argument of those who see the Soviet state as predominantly engaged in the promotion of ethnic identity. In the words of Ronald Suny (1993), the Kremlin “foster[ed] the development in many republics of native cultures, encouraging education in the local languages, and promoting, through a peculiar form of affirmative action, cadres from the dominant nationality.” This argument was initially formulated by Suny and Yuri Slezkine (1994), and is perhaps must succinctly articulated by Rogers Brubaker (1996). Suny argues that the policies of nativization strengthened the national identities of the dominant ethnic groups in Soviet ethnic republics. (1993, 155-6) This outcome was not the intended consequence of Soviet policy, but did result in making national identity the most important form of identity for Soviet citizens.
This situation came about because Bolshevik efforts to create a federation that was national in form but socialist in content resulted in the institutionalization of ethnicity through ethnic republics and passport identification. This institutionalization, it is argued, strengthened ethnic identification among minorities by forcing a single and unchangeable ethnic identity upon each person and by establishing incentives for individuals to identify as members of a minority ethnic group within their titular republic. The personal ethnic identity was enshrined in the internal passport, which listed nationality. Personal nationality was noted in almost all official transactions, was transmitted by descent, and was formally unchangeable across generations except for the offspring of interethnic marriage, who could choose either of the parents’ nationalities when they received their passports at the age of 16 (Brubaker 1996, 31). The incentives
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provided by ethnic republics included preferential treatment in education and employment, native control of most ethnic republics, and policies designed to promote native cultures. (Brubaker 1996, 29, Slezkine 1994, 450, Suny 1993, 155)
These scholars argue that as a result of this combination of personal and territorial institutionalization of ethnicity, minority ethnic identities were strengthened throughout the Soviet Union. Rogers Brubaker notes that the Soviet state, “established nationhood and nationality as the fundamental social categories.” (1996, 23) Similarly, Suny argues that, “Identification with nationality was for most non-Russians a far more palpable touchstone than the eroded loyalty to social class.” (1993, 121) This view that the Soviet Union fostered ethnic identification by institutionalizing ethnicity represents the new conventional wisdom among students of Soviet nationalities policy.
Scholars who follow this line of reasoning tend to underestimate the success of Soviet efforts to assimilate minorities. Brubaker, for example, argues, “The regime had no systematic policy of ‘nation-destroying.’ It might have abolished national republics and ethnoterritorial federalism; … it might have ruthlessly Russified the Soviet educational system… It did none of the above.” (1996, 37) Suny, while aware of the policies that “pulled non-Russians toward acculturation, even assimilation,” (1993, 125) argues that Soviet nativization policies on the whole strengthened minority ethnic identities. (1993, 155) Another recent study argues that minorities “experienced little linguistic Russification during the postwar period,” (Kaiser 1994, 295) despite presenting census tables that provide contradicting evidence.2
As I showed in preceding sections, the processes of linguistic assimilation, linguistic reidentification, and ethnic reidentification actually affected a large number of
2 Kaiser’s tables clearly show extensive Russification among all non-Muslim minorities within the Russian Federation, as well as among urban Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Moldovans living in their home republic (Kaiser 1994, 276-8).
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non-Russians in the Soviet Union. Why has the extent of these processes been neglected by recent scholarship? I argue that there are three reasons why the academic literature has underestimated the extent of assimilation. Most importantly, the emergence of strong nationalist movements throughout the Soviet Union in the late 1980s fostered the belief that if national identity among Soviet minorities was strong enough to generate demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of people in a few regions and tens of thousands of people in many others (Beissinger 2002), then it must have been relatively unaffected by the government’s assimilation policies.
In addition, the relatively short period of time that the assimilation policy was in place meant that its effect was just starting to be felt when the Gorbachev regime’s liberalization led to the end of Soviet Russification efforts. As I describe below, the Soviet government did not begin its wholesale Russification campaign until the late 1950s. Assimilation is a slow, multi-generational process, so that statistics on language and identity change were only starting to reflect the extent to which individuals who grew up in the new environment had switched their primary language of communication to Russian.
Finally, the construction of census questions on language and ethnicity resulted in the underestimation of linguistic Russification among Soviet minorities. The census language question asked respondents to state their native language rather than the language they used most frequently or were most comfortable speaking. In addition, this question immediately followed the census question on nationality. Both Russian and Western demographers believe that many respondents restated their nationality as their native language despite being far more fluent in Russian (Silver 1986, Guboglo 1984).
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For these reasons, the extent of assimilation in the Soviet Union has been understated in recent works. Yet demographers and political scientists writing in the 1970s and early 1980s, before the emergence of nationalist movements throughout the Soviet Union, detected the first signs of assimilation and published data documenting its progression and variation across ethnic groups. (Silver 1974, Kreindler 1985) In the Soviet Union, policies that promoted ethnic identity existed side-by-side with policies that encouraged assimilation. The interaction between these policies played a key role in creating the environment that led to the nationalist mobilization that undermined Gorbachev’s reform program and led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the next section, I discuss the ideological tension that caused the Soviet government to pursue mutually contradictory policies toward its minorities.
Soviet nationalities policies and their impact on assimilation
While the Soviet government’s policies toward its ethnic minorities varied over time, there was always a tension between the goal of showing the world that the Soviet Union treated its ethnic minorities better than any other country in the world and the goal of hastening the future merging of nations into a single communist mass. This tension originated with Lenin’s belief that minorities could only be brought to support socialism once they no longer felt oppressed by the Russian majority and were given the right to use their native language. Lenin summarized this position as follows:
Having transformed capitalism into socialism, the proletariat will create an opportunity for the total elimination of national oppression; this opportunity will become a reality “only” – “only”! – after a total democratization of all spheres, including the establishment of state borders according to the
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“sympathies” of the population, and including complete freedom of secession. This, in turn, will lead in practice to a total abolition of all national tensions and all national distrust, to an accelerated drawing together (sblizhenie) and merger (sliianie) of nations which will result in the withering away of the state.3
This contradiction drove Soviet nationality policy for the next 70 years. The establishment of ethno-federalism, indigenization, and native language education were paired with efforts to ensure the gradual drawing together of nations for the purpose of their eventual merger. While changes in Soviet nationality policy over time resulted from minor shifts toward one or the other of these poles, at no time during the Soviet period was one of these poles completely removed from the ideology of the Soviet government.
Soviet nationalities policy from 1917 through the 1930s has been brilliantly described by Terry Martin (2002). This was the golden age of nationalities, when the ethno-territorial federalism and its concomitant ethnic incentive structure that came to characterize the Soviet Union was established. During this period, the Soviet government established ethnic territorial units from the republic to the village level, promoted members of ethnic minorities to leadership positions in these units, developed literary languages for ethnic minorities, and organized native language education in those languages. During this period, Russification was condemned as great power chauvinism and rejected by the state. The governing ideology stated that members of ethnic minorities could only develop socialism when they reached equal status with the majority Russians. As Slezkine noted, this period represented “the most extravagant celebration of ethnic diversity that any state had ever financed” (1994, 414).
3 V. I. Lenin, “Itogi diskussii o samoopredelenii” (1916), cited in Slezkine (1994, 419).
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By the mid-1930s, this policy was in retreat. Ethnic autonomy was curtailed, and most village and district level ethnic units were abolished. While large ethnic regions were retained, minority political and cultural leaders were accused of nationalism and repressed during the Great Terror of 1936-38. Native language education and the promotion of minority cultures were largely, but not entirely, eliminated in areas outside the remaining ethnic homelands. The government also launched some initial efforts at increasing Russian language knowledge among the minority population (Blitstein 1999).
The trend toward Russification continued during and after World War II. Stalin’s toast to the Russian people at the conclusion of the war endorsed the Russian majority’s position as primus inter pares among the various Soviet nationalities.4 The official histories of minority groups were revised to take this relationship into account; many historians were condemned for “bourgeois nationalism” as a consequence. The entire populations of several ethnic groups, including the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and many others, were exiled en masse to Central Asia and Siberia.
Stalin’s death allowed some of these groups to return to their homelands, but did not change the overall trend toward Russification, which continued until the mid-1980s. The most significant step in this regard was the school reform of 1958. Khrushchev introduced the concept of Russian as the language of interethnic communication throughout the Soviet Union. By the mid-1960s, government policies and statements made it clear to the population that in the Soviet Union, socialism spoke Russian. As part of the campaign to ensure that all Soviet citizens were fluent in the Russian language, ethnic regions were instructed to introduce Russian-language instruction in first grade
4 The text of the first part of the toast reads as follows. “I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and, before all, the Russian people. I drink, before all, to the health of the Russian people, because in this war they earned general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the nationalities of our country.” http://www.cyberussr.com/rus/s-toast-e.html
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and expand it to all schools under their control. Most critically, the Communist Party adopted a resolution that gave parents the right to choose the language of instruction for their children. In many regions, parents were then strongly encouraged to send their children to Russian language schools. Local authorities organized meetings where parents spoke out in favor of Russian-language instruction for their children. Previously, members of minority ethnic groups were required to send their children to national schools, where the minority language was usually the language of instruction (Bilinsky 1968).
The new rules were portrayed as democratic because they allowed parents to choose their children’s language of instruction. And, in truth, many minority parents, especially in urban areas within the autonomous republics and regions of the RSFSR, did prefer to send their children to Russian language schools because of the perception that fluency in Russian was the key to a successful career. As enrollments in schools with native language education declined, many ethnic regions dropped native language education entirely in favor of Russian language education with the native language taught as a subject (Silver 1974).
By the 1980s the majority of non-Russian children throughout the RSFSR and in several other union republics were being educated in the Russian language, even in their homeland regions (Karklins 1986, 104-5).5 The assimilationist policies introduced by Khrushchev were retained for 30 years and were pursued simultaneously with policies that encouraged the perception that ethnic regions were designed to foster the development of minority ethnic groups. As I show in the following sections, this dual
5 Native language education remained the norm in the Baltic Republics, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia except for Kazakhstan. Russian language education was dominant throughout the autonomous republics, in eastern Ukraine, and in Belarus, as well as in urban areas in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.
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policy both encouraged assimilation and promoted the growth of nationalist attitudes in these regions, leading to the formation of nationalist movements after Gorbachev’s liberalization program allowed the formation of non-governmental organizations.
The assimilation process
Assimilation is a concept with multiple meanings. In the aggregate sense, it refers to a change of ethnic identity, usually from a minority or subordinate group to a majority or dominant group, resulting in the “blending into one of formerly distinguishable sociocultural groups” (Elklit and Tonsgaard 1984, 96). For an individual, assimilation implies a shift of identity from one ethnic group to another. In the literature, linguistic assimilation refers to the change of language from one’s traditional national language to that of a different ethnic group. Linguistic assimilation does not always indicate a change of ethnic identity (Connor 1972). It is also unclear what criteria should be used to determine whether an individual has changed his or her language. Changes in language use may not be accompanied by changes in people’s perception of which language they consider native. As I will show below, language use and language identity were often at variance in the Soviet context. To avoid confusion, I refer to change of language use as linguistic assimilation and to change of language identity as linguistic reidentification.
Linguistic assimilation and reidentification in the Soviet Union were promoted by a combination of two factors, urbanization and the reduction of native language education. Since Russians who lived in the Soviet Union’s ethnic regions were usually concentrated in urban areas, individuals who moved to cities were more exposed to Russian language and culture than their peers who stayed behind in the (usually monoethnic) villages. At the same time, urbanization brought a loosening of ties to
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traditional values and customs. City dwellers were also more likely to learn Russian because of their career aspirations. Most of the more prestigious careers in urban areas required not just knowledge of Russian, but fluency in it. City dwellers were also less likely than rural non-Russians to have access to native language education. In the wake of the 1958 school reform, urban native language schools were largely eliminated in the autonomous republics of the RSFSR, eastern and southern Ukraine, and Belarus. They were also reduced in number in Moldova and Kazakhstan. As a result, Silver finds that even as early as 1959, 18.2 percent of urbanized non-Russians considered Russian to be their native language, versus only 3.5 percent of the rural non-Russians. (Silver 1974, 96)
Native language education was also almost entirely absent for non-Russians living outside of their homeland region. While minority students attending Russian language schools in their homelands were usually given the opportunity to study their native language as a subject, this type of instruction did not fully offset the lack of native language education. In many regions, particularly outside the union republics, such courses were considered electives or were additional to the regular school program. In such cases, children did not take these classes were seriously, particularly if they rarely used their ethnic group’s language outside school. Even where such courses were required, they were not sufficient to counteract the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking environment found in almost all Soviet cities.6 Members of Soviet ethnic groups who did not have the opportunity to attend schools that were taught in their native language were much more likely than those who attended such schools to switch to Russian as their primary language (Galstian 1987).
6 The Baltics, the Caucasus, and parts of Central Asia present an exception to this tendency. But these were precisely the regions where children of the titular ethnic group were least likely to receive Russian language schooling.
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The impact of both urbanization and native language education on linguistic assimilation and reidentification was connected to the relative prestige of Russian and the local language. In areas where urban elites primarily used Russian, members of the native group often sought to send their children to Russian-language schools to increase their likelihood of being accepted at a prestigious Russian-language university and thereafter finding a good job. In areas where urban elites spoke the minority language (the Baltics and the Caucasus) and where the labor markets were ethnically segregated (most of Central Asia), minority parents felt more secure in sending their children to national language schools.
Of course, ethnic identity does not change just because one adopts the dominant language consist only of language knowledge. Many Russian-speaking members of ethnic minorities continued to identify themselves as members of the group in documents such as internal passports, but they did not see this category as playing an important role in their lives and shared few if any of the cultural characteristics of the group, a process known as acculturation (Gans 1979). For these people, the Russian language and the Soviet civic identity had replaced ethnicity as the most salient identity categories. These people were more likely to report Russian as their native language in census interviews and sociological surveys. Most importantly, such people were far more likely than other members of the ethnic group to marry outside their group. During the Soviet period, the children of such intermarriages generally identified themselves as Russian (Karklins 1986, 37-9, Volkov 1989, 13-15).7 This two-generation assimilation process developed
7 Except for the Baltic, Central Asian, and Caucasian union republics, where children of marriages between members of the titular ethnic group and Russians chose the titular nationality more frequently. Children of marriages between members of the titular ethnic group and members of another non-Russian group generally adopted the titular ethnic identity. In future work, I plan to examine patterns of identity choice among children of mixed marriages in the Soviet Union and the interaction between these patterns and Soviet nationalities policy.
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over several decades and had just begun to have a significant demographic impact in the 1980s.
Extent of assimilation
Assimilation in the Soviet Union can be measured in two ways. Linguistic reidentification occurs when individuals change their native language while retaining their ethnic identity. This type of assimilation may also be called Russification. A second form of assimilation occurs when individuals change both their native language and ethnic identity. In this section, I use Soviet census data to present some initial findings on the extent of both linguistic Russification and complete ethnic assimilation for Soviet minority ethnic groups.
Claiming Russian as native language
The most straightforward method of measuring Russification is to look at the number of people who declare Russian to be their native language while retaining their ethnic identity. The total number of non-Russians claiming Russian as their native language rose from 10.2 million (10.8 percent) in 1959 to 18.7 million (13.3 percent) in 1989. Kaiser interprets these numbers to mean that “considering the privileged status… [of the Russian language], surprisingly little Russification took place during [this period]” (Kaiser 1994, 262). Yet if we consider the low likelihood that individuals will change their native language during the course of their lifetime, as well as the high rates of assimilation among many ethnic groups, then we can see that linguistic reidentification among non-Russian minorities in the late Soviet period was actually quite rapid.
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The percentage of members of each ethnic group that declared Russian as their native language is shown in Table 1. The highest overall rates of Russification in 1989 were among several groups without an ethnic homeland, such as Jews, Greeks, Germans, and Koreans, as well as among Karelians and Mansi. Other highly Russified groups included peoples of the far north and the traditionally Russian Orthodox ethnic groups with autonomous republic homelands. Of the 25 least assimilated groups, 20 live predominantly in Central Asia or the Caucasus. The most Russified group from either of these regions (Ossetians) ranked 34th overall out of 63 groups. With the exception of Belarusians and Ukrainians, groups with their own union republics also had relatively low rates of Russification.
To measure the impact on Russification of changes in Soviet nationalities policy after the 1950s, we can look at the increase in the percentage of minority members claiming Russian as their native language from 1959 to 1989. Once again, we find that Central Asian and Caucasian ethnic groups had the smallest increase in Russification, as did Kalmyks, Tuvans, and the three Baltic groups. The highest rates of increase in Russification were found among ethnic groups who started with the highest rates – peoples of the far north and traditionally Russian Orthodox ethnic groups with autonomous republic homelands. Most of the groups without an ethnic homeland also had high increases in linguistic reidentification, although Gypsies and territorially concentrated and predominantly rural groups such as Romanians and Hungarians were exceptions. Among the union republic nationalities, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Moldavians had relatively high increases in the rate of Russification.
Members of Soviet minorities were far more likely to become Russified if they lived in urban areas or outside their homeland. Looking at data from 1959, Silver found
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that these two factors have a multiplicative effect, so that minorities living in urban areas outside their homeland were particularly likely to become Russified (Silver 1974, 101). While overall rates of Russification increased substantially between 1959 and 1989, only a few groups showed much evidence of Russification in rural areas within their homeland. (see Table 2) Those with rates above 10 percent in 1989 included Karelians, Komi, Udmurt, Khakass, and all groups with autonomous district-level homelands except the Dolgans. Groups with a greater than 10 percent change in Russification between 1959 and 1989 included Karelians, Koriak, Evenk, Chukchi, Khanty, and Mansi. (Kaiser 1994, 276-8) Rates of linguistic reidentification above 10 percent among urban homeland residents were found among all of the groups with high rates of rural Russification, plus Ukrainians, Belarusians, Moldovans, Buriats, Mari, Mordva, Chuvash, Sakha, Altai, and Dolgan. Rates of change above 10 percent were found among Komi, Karelians, Udmurt, Chuvash, Komi-Permiak, and several northern ethnic groups. However, close to half the groups had negative rates of change in urban Russification between 1959 and 1989, due to migration by native language speakers from rural to urban areas within the homeland.
Among non-Russians living outside the homeland, Russification was far more common. Only four groups had less than 10 percent Russification rates among members living in urban areas outside their homeland. These included the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Tajik groups, many of whose members lived in cities in other Central Asian republics, rather than in Russia. Rates for groups such as Ukrainians, Latvians, Estonians, Belarusians, and Mordva were higher than 50 percent. At the same time, few groups experienced significant changes in rates of urban linguistic reidentification outside the homeland during the 1959-89 period, since members of most groups living in such locations were already highly Russified by 1959. Only among Lithuanians, Bashkirs,
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Balkars, Tatars, and most autonomous district nationalities did the rate of linguistic reidentification increase by more than 10 percent during this period.
For non-Russians living in rural areas outside their homeland, linguistic reidentification rates were low for Central Asian and Caucasian ethnic groups, and high for all others. The only exceptions were Georgians, Kabardin, Balkar, Abkhaz, and Cherkess — Caucasian ethnic groups with linguistic reidentification rates of 10-16 percent in 1989, and Tatars, who had a rate of 8.5 percent. Rates of change were relatively low, averaging 5-7 percent for all groups except inhabitants of autonomous districts, who had rates averaging 14 percent. (Kaiser 1994, 279-81)
Although the overall percentage of non-Russians claiming Russian as their native language increased by only a few percent between 1959 and 1989, there were large increases in Russification among most ethnic groups living outside the Caucasus, Central Asia, or the Baltics. While further analysis would be needed to determine the reasons for this difference, it seems likely that resistance to Russification is increased by a combination of factors such as linguistic distance, religious difference, and higher status of a particular ethnic group in the Soviet ethnic hierarchy.8 A more nuanced view of the extent of linguistic assimilation and reidentification is provided in the next section by introducing the knowledge of Russian as a second language into the analysis.
Four categories of linguistic assimilation
The extent of linguistic Russification may be estimated with measures developed by Brian Silver. Silver describes four categories that distinguish the extent of linguistic assimilation. The assimilated are those who list Russian as their native language and do
8 Elklit and Tonsgaard (1984) provide a theoretical justification for these factors’ positive impact on resistance to assimilation.
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not list their ethnic group’s native language as a second language. Assimilated bilinguals are people who list Russian as their native language and their ethnic group’s native language as a second language. Unassimilated bilinguals are people who list their ethnic group’s native language as their native language and list Russian as a second language. Finally, the parochial group includes individuals who list their ethnic group’s native language as their native language and do not claim any knowledge of the Russian language (Silver 1975, 584). In this section, I use these categories to examine the extent of Russian language knowledge within the RSFSR.
In table 3, I show the trends in these four categories for the republic nationalities of the RSFSR/Russian Federation from 1970 to 1994. For most ethnic groups, the overwhelming majority of the population fits in the unassimilated bilinguals category in all four censuses; these are the people who consider their ethnic group’s language as their native language but also speak Russian. The only exception is the Karelians, most of whom are in either the fully assimilated or assimilated bilinguals categories by 1989. For several other groups, including the Khakass, Komi, Mordva, and Udmurt, more than 25 percent of the population is in these two categories by the end of the time period. Few people place themselves in the Assimilated Bilingual category, showing that most non- Russians who know their national language declare it their native language during the census. Only a few groups have sizable percentages that speak only the national languages. These are primarily Caucasian groups such as the Avars and Chechens, as well as the Sakha and the Tuvans.
Turning to trends over time, the dynamic is similar for virtually all of the groups. Between 1970 and 1979 we see a sharp shift from Parochial to Unassimilated Bilingual, followed by a continuing gradual decline in the number of Parochials through 1994. The
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percentage of each ethnic group in the Unassimilated Bilingual category is fairly stable from 1979 to 1989 and then increases in 1994, often partially at the expense of the Assimilated category. The Assimilated Bilingual category remains relatively stable over time for most groups. After increasing gradually from 1970 to 1989, the percentage of the population in the Assimilated category declines for most nationalities from 1989 to 1994, showing a return to the national language for at least a small percentage of the minority population in the post-Soviet period. While these data confirm our hypothesis that the number of non-Russians who considered Russian their native language was steadily increasing during the Soviet period, it also shows that the vast majority of members of Soviet minority groups retained their national language as their native language as they learned Russian. However, the understanding of native language as an aspect of identity meant that many people listed their national language as their native language even though Russian was their language of daily use or the language they learned first. In the next section, I examine the lack of correspondence between native language and language of use in the Russian Federation.
Native language versus language use
The 1994 Russian microcensus shows the extent to which the census question on native language exaggerates the actual extent of language use.9 Whereas 70 percent of non-Russian respondents declared their ethnic group’s native language to be their native language, only 46 percent declared their ethnic group’s native language to be the language they used at home. Even fewer respondents used their native language at work or at school. The difference between reporting of native language and language of use
9 The microcensus was conducted in February 1994 in all regions of the Russian Federation except Chechnya. Five percent of the population (7.3 million people) were interviewed. The data are considered representative for all but the smallest ethnic groups. For more information, see Goskomstat Rossii (1995).
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varied by nationality. Ethnic groups that have territorial homelands within the Russian Federation had the highest rates of retention for both native language and language of use, as well as the lowest difference between the two indicators. Ethnic groups that did not have a homeland in Russia (including the titular nationalities of the other former Soviet republics), tended to use the Russian language at home while often still declaring their ethnic group’s language as their native language (see Table 4). Kalmyks, Chukchi, Moldovans, Lithuanians, Georgians, and Uzbeks had particularly high differences (over 40%) between these two rates.
The microcensus also shows that few members of minority groups in Russia use their native language at work or in school. Unfortunately, Goskomstat did not publish raw numbers for these two categories, so it is impossible to determine the overall percentage of non-Russians that use their native language at work or in school. The breakdown by ethnicity, however, shows quite clearly that these numbers are quite low. The native language is used in school by more than half of respondents only among three Siberian groups (Sakha, Tuvan, and Altai). Among 44 of the 61 groups, fewer than 10 percent of respondents use their native language in school. Use of the native language at work is slightly more prevalent, with three Dagestani groups (Avar, Tabasaran, and Lezgin) scoring over 40 percent in addition to the same three Siberian groups registering over 50 percent. Nevertheless, fewer than 10 percent of respondents use their native language at school among 29 ethnic groups.
The microcensus data confirms the findings of Soviet researchers, who showed that large numbers of people who claimed the language of their ethnic group as their native language in census reports actually preferred to use Russian both at home and in public. Sociologists conducting surveys in the Soviet period made similar findings. Thus,
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while 69.5 percent of urban Udmurts declared Udmurt to be their native language in 1979, only 15 percent spoke Udmurt at home (Drobizheva 1985, 7). This was also true in major cities outside Russia. Even in Erevan, one of the most monoethnic non-Russian cities in the Soviet Union, twenty percent of Armenians surveyed in 1979-81 stated that they knew Russian better than Armenian, while eleven percent said they predominantly spoke Russian at home (Galstian 1987, 81-3). In Georgia, almost ten percent of urban Georgians used Russian at home in the 1970s (Drobizheva 1985, 7). These data confirm that the extent of linguistic assimilation, as measured by the use of Russian in the home, is much greater than the extent of linguistic reidentification, as measured by the native language question in the census.
Ethnic reidentification
So far, I have focused on linguistic assimilation and reidentification. Yet most Soviet ethnic groups also lost population to ethnic reidentification between census dates. The extent of this kind of reidentification in the Soviet Union was relatively limited, because rules prohibited individuals from changing the ethnic identity inscribed in their passports and required children to declare the nationality of their parents unless their parents were of different ethnic backgrounds. (Zaslavsky 1979) The census, however, allowed individuals to state their ethnicity freely, without checking whether it matched the ethnicity listed in the respondent’s passport (Silver 1986). Nevertheless, the official listing of ethnicity in one’s passport had a socializing effect on respondents so that they became accustomed to identifying themselves according to their passport nationality.
The listing of ethnicity in numerous official documents limited individuals’ freedom to change their ethnic identities and ensured that ethnic reidentification in the
21

Soviet Union was a gradual process. However, while difficult, individual ethnic reidentification was not impossible. Surveys conducted in 1993 in urban areas in several former Soviet union and autonomous republics showed that ethnic identity and the ethnicity listed in one’s passport did not match for 1.5 to 7.2 percent of total respondents, depending on the republic.10 There are numerous reports of individuals having the ethnicity listed in their passports changed, most often in order to ease promotion within the Communist Party hierarchy. Such situations occurred fairly frequently in Bashkortostan, where many Tatars beginning a career in the Communist Party were encouraged to have their passports changed to list them as Bashkir, and were assisted in doing so by party apparatchiks. Some people were able to change their passport ethnicity when having their passports replaced or after marrying a spouse of a different nationality (Karklins 1986, 34). Nevertheless, these individuals were the exception rather than the rule.
Despite the limits on reidentification described above, Anderson and Silver found extensive shifts to Russian ethnic identity between the 1959 and 1970 censuses at an aggregate level among several non-Russian ethnic groups. These shifts occurred primarily, but not exclusively, among the children of intermarried couples who chose Russian as their ethnic identity. The overall rate of ethnic identity change for non- Russians during this period was only about one percent.11 Anderson and Silver show that the groups with the largest shift in identity are the “ASSR-level nationalities with official
10The survey was conducted in Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan by David Laitin and Jerry Hough as part of the Language and Nationality in the Former Soviet Union project. It was designed to represent the most ethnically-mixed environments and is not necessarily representative for the entire republic. The correlations between self-identification and passport nationality were 94.5 percent in Bashkortostan, 98.5 percent in Tatarstan, 92.8 percent in Ukraine, 96.4 percent in Kazakhstan, 95.7 percent in Estonia, and 95.3 percent in Latvia. For more information on the survey and its results, see Laitin (1998) (for the former union republics) and Gorenburg (2003) (for Bashkortostan and Tatarstan).
11All rates listed in this section are the means of a range of about 2.5 percent. The actual number depends on the cohort survival assumption used. See Anderson and Silver (1983) for more detail.
22

homelands in the RSFSR and with an Orthodox Christian religious background” (1983, 475).12 These groups include the Karelians, who lost 17 percent of the population under age 38, the Mordva, who lost 15 percent, and the Chuvash, Komi, Mari, and Udmurt, who each lost about 8-9 percent (Table 5). Finally, the Sakha shifted to Russian identity at a rate of about 6 percent, lower than the groups of Orthodox background but higher than those of Muslim background. Significant population losses among a few other groups, such as the Tuvans and the Bashkirs, were probably not the result of a shift to the Russian identity. Tuvans were most likely emigrating to neighboring Mongolia, while Bashkirs shifted to a Tatar identity at a rate of about 7 percent (Anderson and Silver 1983, 476). Most union-republic nationalities, as well as the Tatars and Buriats, lost population at a rate of 0-3 percent, with Armenians, Georgians, and Russsians gaining from these shifts at a rate of 1-2 percent. The actual identity shift rate for Tatars was probably somewhat higher due to population gains of Bashkirs shifting to a Tatar identity. Despite the low rate of identity shift among Ukrainians and Belarusians, their large total population means that the bulk of the Russian group’s population gain (357,000 out of 600,000) comes from these Slavic groups (Anderson and Silver 1983, 481).
Anderson and Silver’s analysis shows that the highest rates of identity shift are found among the 9-18 year old age cohort. This is the age range during which individuals had to declare their nationality for official documents. Groups with high overall rates of identity shift had even higher rates among this age cohort, with Karelian youth reidentifying at a rate of 31 percent, Mordovians at 28 percent, and the other Orthodox ASSR groups at between 18 and 24 percent. Bashkirs changed their identity at a rate of
12 Anderson and Silver’s analysis did not include ethnic groups without homelands or with homelands below the ASSR level. It seems likely that these groups assimilated at a rate equal to or higher than the Karelians.
23
24 percent, but again primarily to Tatar rather than Russian. Other groups of Muslim background shifted to Russian identity at rates of 7-13 percent, as did Sakha and Buriats. The lowest rates of identity shift were found among ethnic groups from western union republics, such as Estonia and Ukraine. (Table 5)
As Anderson and Silver point out, these rates of ethnic identity shift largely parallel the rates of linguistic Russification for each ethnic group. (Anderson and Silver 1983, 481) This parallel lends support to my hypothesis that linguistic Russification was the first stage of a multi-generational process that culminated in the assimilation of some members of Soviet minority ethnic groups into the Russian majority. The groups that were most susceptible to assimilation pressures were those that had their homelands within the RSFSR and shared the Russian Orthodox religion.
The consequences of assimilation
In this section, I sketch out some hypotheses on the impact of Soviet assimilation policies on Soviet politics, and specifically on the rise of nationalist movements that led to the division of the country into its constituent republics. As assimilation accelerated in the second half of the twentieth century, it had two contradictory consequences for Soviet politics. On the one hand, the adoption of the Russian language and Soviet culture by an ever-increasing number of minority group members created the perception that the Soviet policy of ethnic integration (sblizhenie) was bearing fruit. As the data presented in this paper show, a large and increasing number of young people in most minority ethnic groups were declaring Russian as their native language. The 1994 microcensus shows that, at least within the Russian Federation, an even larger number were switching to Russian as their primary language to communication. For some ethnic groups, the switch
24
to Russian language was combined with a switch to Russian ethnic identity, primarily but not exclusively among the children of mixed marriages. By the early 1980s, both linguistic assimilation and linguistic reidentification in the Soviet Union were on an accelerating trajectory and it seems quite likely that had Soviet nationality policies remained in place for another 20-30 years, many of the Soviet Union’s minority ethnic groups would have become almost entirely Russophone, while a large number of their members would have reidentified as Russian. Given this context, it is not surprising that as late as the early 1980s, Soviet policymakers firmly believed that they had “solved the nationality problem” by integrating the minorities and the Russian majority into a single Soviet people (Sovetskii narod). This perception was proven false by the rapid growth in minority nationalism that started almost immediately after Mikhail Gorbachev announced his perestroika program.
The institutionalist theory that the rise of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union was the result of Soviet nationalities policy underplays the role of grievances in determining the character of the newly established movements’ demands. While the ability of minority nationalists to take advantage of the new political opening to launch powerful mass movements was the result of the Soviet state’s provision of organizational resources to ethnic groups and regions (Gorenburg 2003), many of the nationalist leaders got involved in the movements because they feared that their group’s culture and language were being destroyed by Soviet nationalities policies; the same policies, ironically, that created conditions that allowed the nationalist movements to flourish and, in some cases, to successfully challenge the Soviet state.
These concerns were not always about linguistic assimilation directly. In the Baltic States, where linguistic assimilation was rare and reidentification almost unheard
25

of, activists worried about the rapidly increasing population of Russian migrants, who did not learn the local languages and insisted that locals address them in Russian. Public space became dominated by the Russian language, creating the perception that titular languages were being relegated to the private sphere and had no future. For this reason, concerns about linguistic and cultural issues played a dominant role in the early stages of nationalist mobilization even in areas where members of the titular groups overwhelmingly used their national languages amongst themselves.13 The nationalists’ top priority was to ensure the survival of their ethnic group through a revival of native language use in the public sphere, as well as an increase in the resources given to local cultural needs. The political demands came later, when activists in many Soviet regions decided that greater sovereignty, or even independence, would enable local authorities to begin a local cultural revival and local authorities realized that they could use the nationalist movements to gain more power for themselves vis-à-vis Moscow.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to show that Western scholars have tended to underestimate the success of the Soviet government’s Russification policies, which were enacted in the late 1950s. I show that by the time these policies were repealed under Gorbachev, they had had a significant effect on linguistic and ethnic identities of Soviet minorities, especially among younger cohorts who had grown up in a Russian linguistic environment and were much more likely than their elders to claim Russian as their native language or to change their ethnic identity to Russian. While these policies occasionally led to changes in individual ethnic labels, they were more likely to result in a shift in the salience of particular identity categories, from ethnicity and culture to language and
13 I am indebted to Dominique Arel for this point.
26

belonging to the Soviet people. The success of these policies played an important role in the character of the nationalist movements that were formed during the perestroika movement. These movements’ initial focus on cultural and language demands was not a cover for still impermissible political demands. Nationalist activists feared that their ethnic culture and language were on the way to extinction unless they launched a cultural revival and persuaded the government to restore native language education. Political demands came later, when these activists decided that sovereignty and/or independence for their ethnic region was the best way to ensure that a cultural revival did take place.14
Soviet nationalities policy continually oscillated between the two poles of Russification and ethnophilia. Recent Western scholarship has tended to focus on the Soviet promotion of ethnicity and dismiss the effectiveness of Soviet assimilation policies. In this paper I have shown that given the relatively short period of time these policies were in effect, they were quite successful in getting members of ethnic minority groups to assimilate to the Russian linguistic community and even to the Russian ethnic group. Had the Soviet Union retained such policies for another 1-2 generations, it is not unlikely that a large percentage of minority group members would have declared Russian as their native language or switched their ethnic identity to Russian. I have also sketched out some preliminary hypotheses for the impact of these assimilationist policies on the explosion of nationalist sentiment in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. Future studies should further explore the interaction between the two sides of Soviet nationalities policy and its impact on late Soviet and post-Soviet politics.
14 In Gorenburg (1999), I develop the argument that leaders of republics within the Russian Federation systematically pursued cultural revival policies even when such policies alienated segments of their electorate.
27
Table 1. Linguistic Russification by Ethnic Group (entire Soviet Union, 1959-1989)
1959 1970 1979 1989 1959-1989
Jewish 76.4 78.2 83.3 83.6 7.2
Mansi 40.4 47.4 50.3 62 21.6
Finnish 35.7 42.5 50.3 54.6 18.9
Karelian 28.5 36.8 44.1 51.8 23.3
Greek 46.1 49.5 56.8 51.4 5.3
German 24.2 32.7 42.6 50.8 26.6
Korean 20.5 31.3 44.4 50.1 29.6
Koriak 8.9 18.2 30.6 46.4 37.5
Khanty 22.3 30.5 31.8 38.8 16.5
Mordvin 21.8 22.1 27.4 32.7 10.9
Udmurt 10.7 17.2 23.4 30 19.3
Komi-Permiak 12.1 14.1 22.8 29.7 17.6
Komi 10.5 17.2 23.7 29.5 19
Bulgarian 18.2 24.4 29.1 28.8 10.6
Polish 14.7 20.7 26.2 28.6 13.9
Evenk 8.7 16.5 20.7 28.5 19.8
Belarussian 15.3 19 25.4 28.5 13.2
Chukchi 5.7 16.9 21.2 28.3 22.6
Khakass 13.9 16.3 19 23.6 9.7
Chuvash 9 13 18.1 23.3 14.3
Mari 4.6 8.6 13 18.8 14.2
Ukrainian 12.2 14.3 17.1 18.8 6.6
Nenets 5.5 9 14 18.1 12.6
Dolgan n/a 9.9 9.8 15.9 6
Tatar 7 10.2 13.2 15.6 8.6
Altai 11.2 12.6 13.5 15.5 4.3
Buriat 5.1 7.3 9.8 13.6 8.5
Bashkir 2.6 4.5 7.1 11.2 8.6
Gypsy 23.5 16.7 14.9 10.8 -12.7
Gagauz 4 4.9 8.6 10.6 6.6
Armenian 8.3 7.6 8.4 7.6 -0.7
Moldovan 3.6 4.2 6 7.4 3.8
Kalmyk 7.2 5.9 5.9 7.3 0.1
Ossetian 4.9 5.4 6.6 7 2.1
Cherkess 6.7 5.4 5.9 6.3 -0.4
Sakha 2.4 3.7 4.6 6.1 3.7
Rumanian 2.4 3.6 4.8 5.6 3.2
Balkar 2.2 2.3 2.7 5.4 3.2
Adygei 3.2 3.4 4.2 5.1 1.9
Latvian 4.6 4.6 4.8 5 0.4
Abkhaz 3.1 3.1 4.1 4.9 1.8
Lezgin 3 3.7 4.7 4.8 1.8
Kurd 2.9 3.8 4.8 4.5 1.6
Estonian 4.7 4.4 4.5 4.4 -0.3
Uyghur 2.3 2.8 3.6 3.9 1.6
Hungarian 1.8 2 2.6 3.3 1.5
Ingush 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.8 0.9
28
Karachai 1.5 1.6 2 2.7 1.2
Kabardin 1.9 1.8 2 2.6 0.7
Kazakh 1.2 1.6 2 2.2 1
Kumyk 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 0.7
Avar 0.8 1 1.3 1.9 1.1
Dargin 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.9 1
Lithuanian 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.8 0.6
Chechen 1 1.2 1.3 1.7 0.7
Azeri 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.7 0.5
Georgian 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 0.4
Tuvin 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.6
Karakalpak 0.3 0.4 0.5 1 0.7
Turkmen 0.6 0.8 1 1 0.4
Tajik 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.3
Uzbek 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.2
Kirgiz 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3
Averages
SSR 4 4.4 5.5 5.9 1.9
ASSR 5.7 7.5 9.6 12.1 6.4
AO 7.3 7.9 8.9 10.6 3.3
Aokrug 14.8 20.6 25.2 33.5 18.7
Other 21 24.1 28.6 29.7 8.7
Source: Kaiser 1994, 266-8
29
Table 2. Russian native language by population type (entire Soviet Union, 1989 census)
Homeland Homeland Outside Outside
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Mansi 54 76 45 65
Khanty 38 59 24 53
Koryak 43 57 34 61
Karelian 35 56 41 67
Chukchi 25 52 22 50
Komi 11 42 42 56
Evenk 22 41 23 39
Udmurt 12 39 29 51
Dolgan 7 37 24 47
Komi-Permiak 11 36 46 53
Nenets 11 31 39 55
Chuvash 1 31 19 42
Belarusian 3 30 52 64
Khakass 12 26 46 49
Altai 9 26 33 46
Mari 5 23 16 37
Mordva 4 23 25 51
Ukrainian 2 19 50 57
Buriat 4 18 20 38
Sakha 2 15 36 32
Moldovan 1 11 11 36
Bashkir 1 10 10 27
Kalmyk 2 6 17 35
Tatar 1 5 9 25
Cherkess 0 5 11 29
Abkhaz 1 4 17 29
Latvian 1 3 43 56
Adygei 1 3 9 20
N. Karabakh* 0 3 n/a n/a
N. Osetian 1 3 7 22
Tuvin 0 3 13 14
Kazakh 1 3 4 9
Lezgin 0 2 2 12
Balkar 0 2 14 33
Kabardin 0 2 15 28
Karachai 0 2 7 18
Turkmen 0 2 1 13
Avar 0 2 3 18
Dargin 0 2 2 16
Estonian 0 2 42 61
Tajik 0 2 1 4
Kumyk 0 1 3 16
Uzbek 0 1 1 5
Kyrgyz 0 1 1 7
Azeri 0 1 3 16
Ingush 0 1 5 11
Karakalpak 0 1 2 13
30
Chechen 0 1 3 12
S. Osetian* 0 0 n/a n/a
Georgian 0 0 17 33
Lithuanian 0 0 23 38
Armenian 0 0 9 30
Averages
SSR 1 5 18 31
ASSR 4 13 15 30
AO 3 9 21 33
Aokrug 26 49 32 53
aArmenians outside the homeland exclude those in Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast and are listed under Armenia.
b Ossetians outside the homeland are listed under the entry for N. Ossetia Source: Kaiser 1994, 276-80
31
Table 3. Silver linguistic assimilation categories
1970 1979 1989 1994
Adygei Parochial 28.9 19.3 13.2 10.3
UB 68 76.9 82.2 85.6
AB 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.7
Assim 1.9 2.8 3.6 3.2
Altai Parochial 32.8 18 19.6 15.7
UB 55.1 69.2 65.6 73.4
AB 2.7 2.2 1.9 0.9
Assim 9.2 10.6 13 10.1
Avar Parochial 58.6 35.7 32.8 20.1
UB 40.1 62.8 65 77.3
AB 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Assim 0.9 1 1.5 1.7
Balkar Parochial 24.8 20 15.3 11.3
UB 73.5 78.1 80.1 87
AB 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1
Assim 1.2 1.7 4 1.5
Bashkira Parochial 43.2 29 17.3 14.7
UB 52.9 64.9 72.6 75.1
AB 1.3 0.7 1.8 1.3
Assim 2.5 5.4 8.3 9.1
Buriat Parochial 26 18.3 14.3 10.2
UB 66.8 72.1 72.4 77.1
AB 2.6 2.4 2.5 1.8
Assim 4.5 7.2 10.9 11
Chechenb Parochial 32.4 22.9 24.9 N/A
UB 66.9 76.4 74 N/A
AB 0.2 0.2 0.2 N/A
Assim 0.5 0.6 1 N/A
Cherkess Parochial 24.2 23.2 16 10.3
UB 69.3 69.6 75.6 85.8
AB 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3
Assim 4.2 4.2 4.9 3.5
Chuvash Parochial 29.4 17.6 11.7 9.6
UB 58.5 65.4 65.8 68.8
AB 3.8 4.1 4.4 3.8
Assim 8.2 13 17.9 17.6
Dargin Parochial 56.5 34.9 30.3 17.2
UB 42.2 63.8 67.8 80.5
AB 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Assim 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.8
Ingush Parochial 27.9 18.7 18 10.9
UB 70.9 80 80.2 87.1
AB 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Assim 0.9 1.1 1.4 1
Kabardin Parochial 26.9 20.2 19.6 16.9
UB 71.5 78.1 78 81.2
AB 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Assim 1.1 1.5 2 1.7
32
Kalmyk Parochial 11.5 8.4 6.2 2.4
UB 83.2 86.2 86.9 92.8
AB 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.5
Assim 4.2 4.7 6 4.4
Karachai Parochial 30.9 22.5 18.1 9.3
UB 67.9 76 79.8 89.1
AB 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2
Assim 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.4
Karelian Parochial 3.9 4.4 2.4 1.4
UB 59.9 52.2 46.2 41.4
AB 14.6 12.6 13.5 12.4
Assim 21.6 30.9 37.7 44.6
Khakass Parochial 18.3 12.9 9.5 2.3
UB 65.7 68.6 67.2 71.1
AB 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.9
Assim 12.7 15.7 20.3 23.8
Komi Parochial 20 11.9 8.3 5.6
UB 63.5 65 62.8 65.1
AB 5.1 5.4 5.6 4.4
Assim 11.4 17.7 23.4 25
Kumyk Parochial 41.3 25.9 23.3 11.3
UB 57.1 72.6 74.5 86.8
AB 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Assim 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.6
Lak Parochial 41.5 23.4 17.8 6.6
UB 55.2 73.1 77.3 87.8
AB 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Assim 2.4 2.7 3.7 4.6
Lezgin Parochial 54.2 32.3 26.1 17.5
UB 43.2 64 68 77.9
AB 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2
Assim 2.2 2.9 4.2 3.8
Mari Parochial 29.4 17.4 12.6 7.5
UB 62.5 70.3 69.4 75.1
AB 2.4 2.5 3.2 2.3
Assim 3.8 9.6 14.7 14.9
Mordva Parochial 12.7 7.3 4.8 2
UB 67 67.3 64.3 57.7
AB 7.5 7.2 8 7.9
Assim 12.8 18.2 23 32.2
Osetin Parochial 20.5 13.3 10.2 9.8
UB 74.6 80.7 83 83.3
AB 1.4 1.2 0.9 1
Assim 3.4 4.6 5.5 5.5
Sakha Parochial 54.7 30.5 29.1 28.6
UB 41.7 65 65 67.7
AB 1 1 1.3 0.7
Assim 2.7 3.5 4.7 3
Tabasaran Parochial 68.1 39.4 34.7 19.6
UB 31.2 58.5 62.1 78.4
33
AB 0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Assim 0.6 1 2.3 1.7
Tatar Parochial 28.4 19.5 13 9.6
UB 62.1 68.6 72.6 75.9
AB 3.7 3.4 3.5 2.7
Assim 5.6 8.3 10.7 11.4
Tuvan Parochial 60 39.5 39.5 35.1
UB 38.8 59.3 59.1 63.4
AB 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2
Assim 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3
Udmurt Parochial 19.9 12.5 8.6 7.3
UB 63.6 65.2 62.2 65.3
AB 4.9 4.6 5.3 4.3
Assim 11.4 17.8 23.7 22.9
aBashkirs who consider Tatar their native language are included with those who consider Bashkir their native language for the purposes of this table.
bThe 1994 microcensus was not conducted in Chechnya.
UB=Unassimilated Bilingual, AB=Assimilated Bilingual, Assim=Assimilated
Source: Calculated from Russian and Soviet census publications.
34
Table 4. Native Language and language of use (Russian Federation, 1994 microcensus)
Native Language of Language of Language
language Home Use school use of work use
Tuvan 99 96 70 70
Ingush 98 96 16 20
Kabardin 98 93 28 39
Karachai 98 91 1 16
Tabasaran 98 90 8 42
Balkar 98 90 7 19
Kumyk 98 90 4 26
Dargin 98 89 8 34
Avar 97 91 15 46
Sakha 96 91 75 77
Adygei 96 86 23 25
Lezgin 95 84 14 40
Rutul 95 82 1 19
Kalmyk 95 35 2 2
Lak 94 72 4 10
Osetin 93 75 7 16
Altai 89 74 50 57
Nogai 88 75 3 16
Buriat 87 65 27 27
Roma 86 72 2 6
Tatar 86 61 14 21
Kazakh 86 50 1 5
Kirgiz 83 56 14 16
Mari 83 53 12 26
Cherkess 81 70 2 19
Turkmen 81 59 6 6
Azeri 80 47 1 3
Chuvash 78 51 24 31
Bashkir* 74 56 20 26
Udmurt 73 42 15 26
Khakass 73 42 1 9
Komi 71 40 24 25
Tajik 71 37 9 8
Komi-permiak 70 45 21 30
Dolgan* 67 49 3 19
Armenian 65 35 1 3
Georgian 65 23 0 1
Veps 63 43 9 20
Nenets 61 26 0 6
Chukchi 61 5 0 2
Khanty 60 27 1 10
Mordva 60 24 2 10
Moldovan 58 13 1 1
Uzbek 56 16 2 1
Shor 54 22 2 3
Even* 53 20 7 19
Lithuanian 51 10 1 0
35
Nanai 47 11 2 3
Karelian 43 15 0 3
Latvian 40 6 2 1
Estonian 39 10 0 1
German 36 13 0 3
Greek 36 12 0 1
Ukrainian 33 5 0 1
Korean 32 11 1 1
Finn 30 7 1 2
Mansi 30 4 0 0
Belarus 29 2 0 0
Koriak 21 3 1 4
Evenk* 15 6 1 1
Jews 11 4 0 0
*=high number assimilated to other language (Bashkir to Tatar, others most likely to Sakha) Source: Goskomstat Rossii 1995
36
Table 5. Ethnic reidentification by ethnic group, percent reidentifying (entire Soviet Union, 1959-70)
Age 9-18 Age 0-38
Belarusian 1.7 0
Moldavian 5.9 1.4
Ukrainian 1.5 1.1
Estonian -0.1 2.4
Latvian 1.8 1.2
Lithuanian 0.7 -0.1
Armenian 6.2 -1.2
Georgian 4.3 -1.4
Azeri 13.4 1.1
Kazakh 2.9 -0.3
Kirgiz 11.6 3.0
Tajik 8.0 2.1
Turkmen 8.7 1.3
Uzbek 8.3 0.1
Buryat 8.8 3.5
Chuvash 19.7 8.2
Karelian 31.6 17.3
Komi 17.9 8.3
Mari 24.2 7.8
Mordva 28.6 15.2
Tuvan 3.9 5.1
Udmurt 23.2 9.2
Yakut 13.0 6.1
Bashkir 24.3 7.0
Tatar 7.0 2.0
Russians -2.0 -0.8
Non-Russian Slavs 2.8 1.2
Non-Slavs 3.8 0.8
All Non-Russians 2.9 1.0
Source: Anderson and Silver 1983
37
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